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Non-Technical Summary
In this paper, the role of intermediaries, e.g. banks, under quantity based regulation
with tradeable permits is examined. An example is the EU Emissions Trading Sche-
me (EU ETS). In the EU ETS, the total amount of eligible greenhouse gas emissions
is fixed in a certain period of time and must not be exceeded. Per unit of emissions,
one permit is assigned. Regulated firms are free to trade these permits on the open
market, which allows achieving the environmental objective of not exceeding the
total amount of emissions in an economically efficient way.
Trading of emissions permits is often arranged by intermediaries. Surveys amongst
German companies regulated by the EU ETS showed, that most companies trade
permits with the help of intermediaries instead of directly becoming active at the
exchange. Direct trading at the exchange is mostly done by larger emitters. This
paper first examines the choice of regulated firms to trade with intermediaries or
directly at the exchange. In a second step, pricing strategies by intermediaries are
discussed with a special focus on the possibility of monopolistic or monopsonistic
pricing. The model shows that there is no chance for monopolistic or monopsoni-
stic pricing by intermediaries if there are at least two non-colluding intermediaries
in the market. A model of monopsonistic pricing for the case of a single interme-
diary in the market is discussed in detail.
Model applications, based on empirical data and official compliance data form the
EU ETS in Germany show that under a competitive situation, the fees charged by
intermediaries for permit trading services are rather small (less than 2% of the va-
lue of traded assets). Total costs for trading of allowances in the case of a single
non-competitive intermediary are assessed to be six-times higher than in the com-
petitive setup. For the EU ETS it can be concluded that there is no reason to expect
monopolistic or monopsonistic pricing by intermediaries.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Dieses Arbeitspapier befasst sich mit der Rolle von Intermediären, z.B. Banken,
in Regulierungssystemen, die auf handelbaren Eigentumsrechten basieren. Ein
Beispiel dafür stellt der EU–Emissionshandel (EU–EHS) dar. Im EU–EHS ist die
Gesamtmenge zulässiger Treibhausgasemissionen europaweit festgeschrieben und
darf nicht überschritten werden. Pro Einheit an Emissionen wird ein Emissions-
recht ausgestellt. Regulierten Unternehmen steht es frei, diese Emissionsrechte auf
Märkten zu handeln, wodurch das Umweltziel (Nicht-Überschreitung der Höchst-
menge an Emissionen) kosteneffizient erreicht werden kann.
Der Handel mit Emissionsrechten wird oft mit Hilfe von Intermediären durchge-
führt. Umfragen zeigten, dass die Mehrzahl der im EU–EHS in Deutschland re-
gulierten Unternehmen nicht direkt an der Börse aktiv wird, sondern in direktem
Kontakt mit Intermediären Emissionsrechte handelt. Direkter Handel an der Börse
wird vor allem von großen Emittenten betrieben. In diesem Papier wird zunächst
die Entscheidung regulierter Unternehmen für den Handel mit Intermediären oder
den direkten Handel an der Börse modelliert. Anschließend werden Preibildungs-
strategien von Intermediären beleuchtet und dabei insb. die Möglichkeit mono-
polistischen oder monopsonistischen Verhaltens von Intermediären in Erwägung
gezogen. Im theoretischen Modell zeigt sich, dass monopolistisches oder mono-
psonistisches Verhalten von Intermediären höchst unwahrscheinlich ist, so lange
mindestens zwei Intermediäre auf dem Markt aktiv sind. Ein Modell monopson-
istischer Preisbildung für den Fall eines einzigen im Markt aktiven Intermediärs
wird ausführlich dargestellt.
Modellanwendungen auf Basis empirischer Daten aus dem EU–EHS in Deutsch-
land zeigen, dass unter kompetitiven Bedingungen die von Intermediären gefor-
derten Entgelte für den Handel mit Emissionsrechten vergleichsweise gering sind
(weniger als 2% des Wertes gehandelter Zertifikate). Für den Fall eines einzel-
nen nicht–kompetitiven Intermediärs würden die Gesamtentgelte etwa sechsmal
so hoch ausfallen wie unter kompetitiven Bedingungen. Für das EU–EHS kann
nicht davon ausgegangen werden, dass Intermediäre monopolistische oder mono-
psonistische Preise setzen können.
Financial Intermediaries and Emissions Trading
Market Development and Pricing Strategies
Peter Heindl
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)∗
October 5, 2012
Abstract
This paper examines the role of intermediaries in quantity regulation theoretically and presents
a data application to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The choice of regulated firms
to trade permits through intermediaries or directly at the exchange is discussed. Permit pricing
strategies of intermediaries and possible issues of market power of intermediaries are mod-
eled. Based on empirical data, the model application aims to assess the actual costs (fees, fixed
costs) from permit trading, which represent costs of transacting. In a competitive setup, costs
are relatively modest with about 1% to 2% of the permit price. In the EU ETS, firms that trade
more than 283,000 tCO2/year are likely to directly access the exchange while others trade with
intermediaries. In the unlikely event of an intermediary having market power, overall costs
would be six times higher in the model application. Options for regulated firms to access a
permit exchange directly at low costs decrease the costs of transacting considerably in a com-
petitive and non-competitive intermediary market.
Keywords: permit trading; financial intermediaries; market power
JEL-Classification: Q52; D42; D21
1 Introduction
Trading of emissions allowances is a central feature of quantity regulation and fluid
exchange of permits between entities with different marginal appreciation of emissions
allowances is required for a least–cost solution to be achieved. For quantity–based reg-
ulation schemes in the United States it was reported that ’sticky’ trading limited the
success of regulation in terms of economic efficiency. While cost reductions compared
to previous command–and–control approaches were realized, strict cost efficiency was
not achieved [10, 12]. Transaction costs for permit trading are a potential source of effi-
ciency losses in schemes of tradeable permits, firstly compared to a first–best situation
with zero transaction costs and secondly, compared to regulation by prices, where no
trading of allowances occurs [25, 22, 6].
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Intermediaries potentially play an important role in organizing permit trades at least
costs mostly by decreased costs for searching and negotiating [5]. For the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), considerable activities of intermediaries in the permit
market are reported. After the scheme started in 2005, a large number of intermedi-
aries entered into the market, supplying services for regulated firms, including permit
trading [4]. For the case of Ireland, it was reported that firms became active in permit
trading with the help of intermediaries [15]. For Germany it was reported that most
firms trade permits with the help of intermediaries. A survey from 2012 reported that
12.5% of firms in the EU ETS in Germany traded directly at the exchange, while the re-
maining firms did not [2, 19, 18]. In fact, intermediaries helped to keep the transaction
costs for trading of allowances relatively moderate in the early years of the EU ETS [11].
It is commonly understood that firms specialize on task in which they have compar-
ative advantages and that other tasks might be ’outsourced’, i.e. goods and services
are purchased on the market instead of produced inside the firm. While Coase [3] ex-
pected the cost for transacting to shape markets and firms, Alchian and Demsetz [1]
suggested that the structuring of labor inputs in the sense of ’team production’ are
an important determinant of what is produced inside the firm or purchased from the
market. Both arguments might be useful to explain the existence of intermediaries in
markets for tradeable permits. If a firm regulated by an emissions trading scheme has
no comparative advantage in managing financial products, like emissions allowances,
then it will have an incentive to purchase the service of managing permit trades on the
market. Dependent on the design of the regulation scheme, e.g. which firms are regu-
lated, intermediaries could be an important part of emissions trading by reducing costs
of transacting by offering services in which they have comparative advantages. To my
best knowledge, the role of intermediaries in markets for tradable permits has so far
not been examined in detail.
A few questions seem to be unanswered so far. Firstly, how do regulated firms de-
cide whether they trade with the help of intermediaries or directly at the exchange?
Secondly, how do intermediaries behave in the market for permits, i.e. how are their
pricing strategies and is there potentially the risk of market power of intermediaries?
While there are a number of contributions to potential market power of regulated firms
[8, 7, 9, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 16], there are so far no contributions on market power
of intermediaries in the literature on environmental regulation. If intermediaries charge
fees for their services, those fees represent costs of transacting on the permit market
and will potentially decrease economic efficiency of quantity–based regulation [12, 25].
Therefore, an assessment of the magnitude of charged fees is of interest to evaluate po-
tential impacts on economic efficiency of tradeable permits.
In the following section, a simple model is developed that explains the choice of the
trading mode (intermediary vs. direct trading at exchange) of firms regulated by trade-
able permits. It is shown that the choice of the trading mode is dependent on the num-
ber of traded permits in a certain period of time. Firms that trade larger volumes of
permits are more likely to trade directly at the exchange compared to firms that trade
smaller volumes. The result is derived by a simple fixed–cost argument and is sup-
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ported by empirical data [2, 19, 18].
Section 3 focuses on permit pricing strategies of intermediaries. If there are (at least)
two or more intermediaries in the permit market, a competitive market will evolve. In
the unlikely case that one single intermediary is active in the permit market, the inter-
mediary will have market power. A simple pricing scheme is developed where prices
under market power are dependent on the individual characteristics of regulated firms
(i.e. abatement costs, unrestricted emissions, and free allocation).
An application of the model is presented in Section 4. First, the case of competitive
intermediaries is examined based on empirical findings and official compliance data
from the EU ETS in Germany. The application results imply that unit fees charged by
intermediaries are relatively small. To contrast the competitive case to the hypothetical
case of a market with one intermediary with market power, the simple model presented
in Section 3 is populated with German compliance data from the EU ETS. A central
result of the model application is that total costs for permit trading (fees and fixed costs
for exchange trading) are about six times higher in the hypothetical non–competitive
case with an intermediary having market power, compared to the case of a competitive
market.
2 The Choice of the Trading Mode
Suppose an emitter under regulation by tradeable permits that receives less allocation
than its actual emissions and is a net buyer of permits. The firm has no preexisting
trading desk and no staff experienced with exchange trading. If the firm wants to
become active at an exchange to purchase permits, it has to install a trading desk. This
would be associated with fixed costs of m1. The marginal permit price is assumed to
equal the market price at the exchange g. Costs for trading a number of s permits on
an exchange are
ct = m+ gs. (1)
Alternatively, the firm may consult an intermediary to purchase permits. The interme-
diary offers a price p ≥ g for each permit purchased on behalf of the regulated firm2.
The intermediary charges a trading fee per permit that is given by f
f = p− g. (2)
1Fixed costs could include fees, hardware, trading software, proof of liquidity, staff training, security
measures, change of organizational processes, etc. For a trading account at the European Energy Exchange
(EEX) for example, fees of at least EUR 20,000 per year apply.
2To simplify this section, only firms that purchase permits are considered. However, assuming a sym-
metric fee f , the case of a firm that sells permits can be easily implemented. If the firm sells permits, the
intermediaries offer would be ps ≤ g with f = g − ps.
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The firm decides which option for permit trading it will choose by comparing the costs
of intermediary services and exchange trading and choosing the option with the lowest
costs. For the case of permit purchases, the firm minimizes costs by solving the problem
min c =
ps, if intermediary service with p ≥ gm+ gs, if exchange trading. (3)
Figure 1 illustrates the case of a firm that is a net buyer of permits. The firm can choose
between trading at an exchange with costs m+gs, and the intermediaries price offer ps
according to (3). As the Figure shows, the choice of the trading mode by the regulated
firm is dependent on the amount of traded permits s. Equating ps = m+gs and solving
for s yields the threshold trading volume s¯ that determines the choice between using
intermediary services and internal exchange trading of a regulated firm. For trading
volumes s ≤ s¯ (given m, p and g), intermediary services are considered. For s > s¯ the
firm installs a trading desk and purchases permits directly at the exchange. Equating
ps = m+ gs and solving for s yields the intersection of the cost functions
s¯ =
m








Figure 1: Costs of installing an internal trading desk (m + gs) and making use of intermediary services (ps)
plotted on the number of traded permits s. For s < s¯, the firm will trade with help of an intermedi-
ary. When s ≥ s¯, the firm will install an internal trading desk. The densely dashed line (gs) are the
costs without additional fixed costs or fees.
For a given trading volume s, and prices g, and p, fixed costs m determine the choice
of the trading mode. Consequently, a threshold value of m can be derived. Solving
ps = m+ gs for fixed costs m yields
m¯ = s(p− g). (5)
The assumption that the intermediary charges a unit fee f simplifies the model. If the
fee also incurred a fixed cost component, the model would hold as well. A pure fixed
fee charged by the intermediary would lead to a situation where the choice of the trad-
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ing mode is independent of the number of traded permits. The firm would trade with
the intermediary if the fixed fee is below the fixed costs for installing a trading desk m
and vice versa.
The simple approach taken above shows that the choice of the trading mode (interme-
diary service vs. exchange trading) is dependent on the number of traded permits s and
fixed costs for becoming active at an exchange m. It is motivated by the empirical find-
ing that firms with smaller trading volumes did not trade permits at exchanges in the
first and second trading period of the EU ETS, while firms with larger trading volumes
became active at exchanges [2]. Relaxing the assumption that firms can trade permits at
market price g and allowing for fixed costs and unit fees in permit trading thus leads to
different trading strategies of firms with different trading volumes and helps to explain
the empirical evidence found for the EU ETS. The model assumes linear unit–costs for
trading when trading with an intermediary and size–dependent unit–costs when trad-
ing at the exchange. While this assumption considerably simplifies the analysis in the
following section, the approach differs to previous contributions such as Stavins [25]
who explicitly mentions that unit fees taken by intermediaries might be dependent on
the amount of traded permits and are therefore non-linear. While general transaction
costs for permit trading will include unit fees as well as other expenditures, e.g. for in-
formation gathering and labor costs, total transaction costs might exhibit a non-linear
structure and will be size–dependent (i.e. dependent on the number of traded permits)
even in the case of non-size dependent unit fees as assumed here. Empirical studies
suggest that, for the case of the German EU ETS, transaction costs for permit trading
(excluding fees) show mild size dependence, which implies scale economies in the gen-
eral management of permit trading [13].
3 Permit Pricing by Intermediaries
Since fees charged by intermediaries in the permit market influence the choice of the
trading mode of regulated firms, the pricing strategy of intermediaries comes into fo-
cus. Pricing strategies may be determined by two main aspects. Firstly, by the number
of intermediaries in the permit market, and secondly, by the ’reaction’ of regulated
firms to the intermediaries’ price. Whether or not there is a competitive situation in
permit supply by intermediaries is determined by the number of intermediaries active
in the market. However, even in a non–competitive situation of permit supply, regu-
lated firms would have the option to ’escape’ the non–competitive pricing by interme-
diaries and purchase permits directly at the exchange. Subsection 3.1 examines the case
of two or more intermediaries in the permit market, which will lead to a competitive
situation. Subsection 3.2 examines the (unlikely) case of only one intermediary active
in the market which behaves as a monopsonistic supplier of permits. In that case, the
intermediary can offer a monopsonistic price, however, limited by the firm’s options of
becoming active directly at an exchange.
To examine the intermediaries pricing strategies, the regulated firm’s demand for per-
mits needs to be derived. The regulated firm’s costs for pollution control are deter-
mined by abatement costs α and are dependent on the amount of pollution abatement
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q. The abatement cost function is continuously differentiable so that d
2cf
dq2 > 0 for q > 0.





The firm minimizes costs by choosing abatement quantity q. Its unrestricted emissions
are q0 and freely allocated permits are a. It is assumed that a < q0 − q and the firm is a
net permit buyer. It considers the permit price p offered by the financial intermediary.






αq2 + p(q0 − q − a)
]
. (7)
Solving problem (7) yields the optimal amount of abatement given the permit price p,





The regulated firm’s demand for permits s > 0 equals the number of permits it will
purchase when solving problem (7).
s = q0 − qp − a. (9)
Substituting qp in (9) by (8) yields the permit demand function in equilibrium
s = q0 − p
α
− a. (10)
3.1 Two or More Intermediaries
From the Bertrand paradox it follows that a number of (at least) two non-colluding
intermediaries will be sufficient to generate a competitive environment on the permit
market since there are no capacity constraints in permit supply by intermediaries3, per-
mits are a homogeneous good, and prices are set simultaneously [26].
Suppose the intermediaries’ costs for supplying permits to a regulated firm are depen-
dent on fixed costs c, costs for acquiring permits on the market g, and the number of
permits s acquired for the firm
ci = c+ gs. (11)
Then, in a market with two or more intermediaries, the permit price offered to a regu-
lated firm would be equal to the marginal costs of the intermediaries
pc = g. (12)
3While a quantity constraint under quantity regulation generates a price, the quantity constraint is as-
sumed not to be so strict that it hampers trading by intermediaries. Therefore, permits are assumed to be
available on a market and that the quantity constraint only influences the price of permits but not their avail-
ability.
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Intermediaries may charge fees for their services. This could be modeled by introduc-
ing an additional cost term in the intermediary’s cost function (11)4, but is omitted since
it would unnecessarily complicate the analysis of non–competitive pricing. If interme-
diaries traded permits at price g without charging additional fees, no regulated firm
would have an incentive to trade at an exchange, which is in contrast to empirical find-
ings for the EU ETS [15, 2, 18, 19]. Fees charged by intermediaries are reconsidered in
the data application in Section 4.
So far, the analysis has shown that intermediaries will behave competitive in allowance
trading due to the homogeneous character of emissions allowances if there are at least
two intermediaries in the market. An exemption would be the case of non-homogeneous
permits, for example offset permits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
From 2013 onwards, CDM permits from the destruction of industrial gases will be no
longer eligible for compliance in the EU ETS. For the special case of CDM permits trad-
ing between intermediaries and firms regulated by the EU ETS, the Bertrand paradox
might possibly not hold.
In principle it is possible that there will be only one intermediary in the market for
allowances. Although this might not be true for the case of the EU ETS, pricing by a
monopolistic/monopsonistic intermediary is examined in the following section.
3.2 A Single Intermediary
A monopsonistic supplier of permits would aim to maximize its return from permits
sells. To do so, the intermediary equates the marginal revenues from permit sells to the
marginal costs of acquiring permits on the market. The intermediaries costs are given
by (11). The intermediaries revenue is derived by resolving the firms permit demand
function in equilibrium (10) for p and multiplying by the number of traded permits s
Ri = (q0 − s− a)αs. (13)
Equating marginal costs and marginal revenues, and solving for the amount of traded
permits s yields the amount of permit sells to the firm that would maximize the inter-
mediary’s return
sm =
−g + α(q0 − a)
2α
. (14)
The intermediary could offer the firm a price pm that would incentivize the firm to
purchase the amount of permits sm that maximizes the intermediary’s return. The
monopsonistic permit price is given for pm = α(q0 − sm − a), where the firm is in





(g + α(q0 − a)). (15)
4The cost function could be written as ci = c + gs + fs, where f are administrative costs of the inter-
mediary. In that case, the competitive permit price would be pc = g + f , where f represents the ’fee’. Since
adding an additional cost term would not change the results of the analysis of non–competitive pricing, but
would increase complexity, the cost function is simplified as in Equation (11) and administrative costs of the
intermediary are omitted.
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The markup is dependent on the permit price on the market g, the firm’s free allocation
a and its unrestricted emissions q0, and is positive as long as the firm is a buyer of




(α(q0 − a)− g). (16)
Monopsonistic price setting is limited by two aspects. Firstly, the reaction function of
the regulated firm (Equation 8). As the price offered by the intermediary rises, the firm
abates more and its demand for permits decreases. As the price offer by the interme-
diary decreases, the firm abates less and its demand for permits increases. This has an
impact on the revenues of the intermediary. The optimal (monopsonistic) number of
sold permits is therefore given by sm (14) at price pm (15). The intermediary needs full
information about the firm’s reaction function to implement the monopsonistic price.
Uncertainty about the firm’s reaction to price changes will limit the options for monop-
sonistic pricing.
Secondly, the firm has the option to trade permits on the exchange with fixed costs m
(Equation 3). The threshold trading volume, as derived in Equation (4), will determine
if the firm trades with the intermediary at price pm or becomes active at the exchange.
Plugging pm into Equation (4) yields the monopsonistic threshold trading volume s¯m
which is given by
s¯m = − 2m
g + (a− q0)α. (17)
For trading volumes s > s¯m, the firm would trade permits on the exchange instead of
purchasing permits from the intermediary at price pm. As a reaction to the ability of
the firm to trade at the exchange, the intermediary could offer the monopsonistic price
pm if s ≤ s¯m and an alternative price if s > s¯m. The best responds of a monopsonistic
intermediary to the firm’s ability to trade at the exchange would be to mimic the firm’s
costs for exchange trading as in Equation (1) and offer an alternative unit–price not
exceeding




Under the assumption that there is only one intermediary in the market, the interme-
diary could charge the monopsonistic price pm for trading volumes less or equal the
critical trading volume (s ≤ s¯m) and a price pn for trading volumes above the thresh-
old (s > s¯m). Price pn is below the monopsonistic price, above the competitive price,
and does not exceed the costs of a firm to trade on the exchange. Thus, the monopson-
istic intermediary would discriminate prices depending on the actual volume of trades
(Figure 2).
3.3 The Difference between Purchasing and Selling
In the previous sections a firm that is net purchaser of permits was assumed to simplify
the model. If a firm would be a net seller of permits, the model would still hold, but
instead of fees or markups that are added to the permit price g, fees or markups would
have to be subtracted. Assuming a symmetric fee f that applies when permits are







Figure 2: Price discrimination by an intermediary with market power. The intermediary offers the monop-
sonistic price pm for trading volumes s ≤ s¯m. For trading volumes s > s¯m, the mimicking price
pn is offered. Regulated firms with a preexisting trading desk trade at the market price g because
they face no additional costs from introducing trading.
purchased or sold, there will be a spread in actual perceived permit price by firms
dependent if they are net seller or net buyer of permits. If the firm trades with an
intermediary at a price p, the spread will be
p =
g + f, if net purchaserg − f, if net seller. (19)
If the firm trades at the exchange, a spread will result from fixed costs for trading. The
actual perceived permit price p is given for
p =
g + ms , if net purchaserg − ms , if net seller. (20)
In both cases, costs for participating at the market lead to a deviation from the market
price g. If the firm is net purchaser of permits and faces costs, fees increase costs. If the
firm is net seller of permits, fees decrease the revenue from selling permits. If fees or
markups are small, this will have almost no effect on the final outcome of regulation
or the final allocation of resources. However, if fees or markups are considerable, it
will lead to a situation where the final allocation is dependent on the initial allocation
of permits, i.e. if the firm is net seller or net purchaser of permits (Figure 3). This is
because price p = g+ f will result in different abatement volumes than price p = g− f .
If there is more than one regulated firm, each firm will approach its cost minimum
given the fee. However, since economic efficiency of regulation by quantities requires
that abatement costs of all sources are equated so that no source can abate at lower
costs, economic efficiency could be decreased if per unit fees differ between firms or if
some firms are net sellers while others are net buyers.









Figure 3: Actual abatement when fees f are taken into account for abatement decisions. The abatement vol-
ume without any costs for selling/purchasing permits is q∗. If fees apply for trading, q∗+ is the
abatement level for a firm that is net purchaser of permits and q∗− is the abatement level for a firm
that is net seller of permits.
4 Application: The EU ETS in Germany
Based on official compliance data and survey data from German firms in the EU ETS,
the model from Section 2 and 3 can be populated with real world data. Compliance
data of German firms are aggregated from the installation level (about 1,700 installa-
tions) to the firm level (816 firms). Aggregation is essential to achieve ’correct’ trading
volumes since trading is organized at the firm level rather than on the installation level.
In a first application, the unit fees for permit transactions in a competitive situation are
determined. Survey data of German firms in the EU ETS that link the firm’s choice of
the trading mode (intermediary vs. exchange) to their net trading volumes are used to
determine the unit fees that are required to reproduce the trading pattern based on the
model from Section 2. The application is scaled-up from the small survey sample to all
firms in the German EU ETS by feeding-in the trading fees. In a second application,
the hypothetical outcome of a market with a monopsonistic intermediary is examined
using the pricing strategy developed in Section 3.2. Unit fees for trading and exchange
traded volumes are compared for the competitive and non–competitive (monopsonis-
tic/monopolistic) case to allow for a comparison of market efficiency in both cases.
4.1 Actual Trading Patterns in Germany
A sample of 56 out of 816 firms in the German EU ETS is available that documents the
trading activities of firms and is merged with official compliance data. In the sample
12.5% of firms trade directly at the exchange [2]. Firms that trade directly at the ex-
change also trade otherwise, e.g. ’over the counter’, in bilateral trades, and with banks.
The remaining firms trade with the help of intermediaries, which can be banks or bilat-
eral trades with other firms, but are not active on the exchange. Firms that trade on the
exchange in average run 12 installtions, while firms that are not active on the exchange
run in average 2 installations. Firms that are active at the exchange also have higher
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annual emissions (1.4 million tCO2 in median5) compared to firms that are not active at
the exchange (0.076 million tCO2 in median). Also annual trading volumes, defined as
the absolute value of the difference between annual emissions and annual free alloca-
tion, differ strongly between firms that trade at the exchange (730,000 tCO2 in median)
and firms that do not trade at the exchange (28,000 tCO2 in median). Thus, the choice
of the trading mode clearly is dependent on emission levels and trading volumes of
firms in the sample. The larger the emission levels and trading volumes of a firm, the
higher the probability that it becomes active at the exchange.
Table 1 shows the unit fees f that are required to reproduce the share of 12.5% of firms
trading at the exchange for different fixed costs to set up a trading deskm. At fixed costs
of EUR 50,0006, the unit fee that reproduces the survey’s result amounts to EUR 0.176,
or 1.2% of the permit price when the price would be EUR 15 (average price level in the
EU ETS from 2008 to June 2011). The result can be easily reproduced by using Equation
(4). At m = 50, 000 and f = 0.176, the threshold trading volume s¯ where exchange
trading could be implemented in a cost efficient way is given by m/f = 284, 091.
While fixed costs m have a relatively strong impact on the unit fee that is required to
reproduce the empirical pattern of 12.5% firms trading at the exchange, the treshold
trading volume s¯ is relatively high and comparably robust for changes in fixed costsm.
As shown in Table 1, the treshold volume of traded permits is above 283,000 tCO2 for
reasonable values of m.
Fixed costs m (EUR) Unit fee f (EUR) f/EUR15 s¯ (tCO2)
30,000 0.106 0.007 283,019
40,000 0.141 0.009 283,688
50,000 0.176 0.012 284,091
60,000 0.211 0.014 284,360
70,000 0.246 0.016 284,553
80,000 0.281 0.019 284,698
90,000 0.317 0.021 283,912
100,000 0.352 0.023 284,091
Table 1: Unit fees f (in Euro) required to have 12.5% of firms in the survey sample (n=56) trading at the
exchange at fixed costs for installing a trading desk m (in Euro). f/EUR15 is the cost share of unit
fees at permit price EUR 15. s¯ (tCO2) is the threshold trading volume (Equation 4).
Now that the required fees f that reproduce the observed trading patterns given fixed
costs for exchange trading m are derived, the fees are applied to all firms regulated by
the EU ETS in Germany (n=819) to obtain trading patterns in the population. Given fee
f and fixed costs for exchange trading m, effective costs are calculated for both trad-
ing options (intermediary vs. exchange trading) dependent on the number of traded
permits of each firm and the chosen trading model (intermediary vs. exchange). The
trading volumes implied by the data sˆi are given by free allocation in 2011 minus veri-
5Since there is large variation in annual emissions and annual trading volumes, the median is used
instead of the mean.
6For a trading account at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) for example, fees of at least EUR 20,000
per year apply for a full trading account by June 2012 according to official EEX documents. Internal costs for
the firm to set up the trading desk might lead to fixed costs in a range of 30,000 to 50,000 or higer. In 2012,
EEX announced to offer a special discount for firms that wish to participate only at public permit auctions.
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fied emissions in 20117.
Each firm chooses its trading mode as given by Equation (3). After each firm has de-
cided on how to trade allowances, the total costs for intermediary services or exchange
trading can be calculated. Firms that decide for intermediary services pay a fee per unit
of traded allowances and face costs sˆi · f . Firms that decide on exchange trading face
fixed costs m.
m f % Firms % Emissions % Traded Costs Costs
EUR EUR at exchange at exchange at exchange (total) mEUR (average) tEUR
30,000 0.106 5.37% 77.53% 86.78% 3.6 4.4
40,000 0.141 5.25% 77.32% 86.59% 4.8 5.9
50,000 0.176 5.25% 77.32% 86.59% 6.0 7.3
60,000 0.211 5.25% 77.32% 86.59% 7.2 8.8
70,000 0.246 5.25% 77.32% 86.59% 8.4 10.2
80,000 0.281 5.25% 77.32% 86.59% 9.6 11.7
90,000 0.317 5.25% 77.32% 86.59% 10.8 13.1
100,000 0.352 5.25% 77.32% 86.59% 12.0 14.6
Table 2: Percent of Firms that trade at the exchange with their share of emissions in the German EU ETS and
the corresponding share of traded permits. Costs are displayed on the right hand side with total
costs in million EUR and average costs per firm in thousand EUR.
Table 2 shows that rising fixed costs and fees have almost no effect on the number of
firms that trade at the exchange and the share of traded emissions at the exchange. This
is because the threshold trading volume s¯ in Table 1 is unsensitive for changes in fixed
costs m and fees f when reproducing the empirical pattern. Table 2 also shows that
the larger share of traded permits is traded at the exchange (86% of about 154 million
permits) and that these large volumes are traded by a small number of firms (about 5%
out of n=819). Total costs and average costs per firm are sensitive to changes in fixed
costs m and fees f . Since the fees were derived so that the empirical trading patterns
in the small sample could be mimicked (Table 1) for given fixed costs m, fixed costs
are the main driver of total and average costs in Table 2. Since a trading account for
carbon permits, for example at the European Energy Exchange (EEX), comes at costs of
about EUR 20,000 and additional internal costs (personal costs, hardware, training of
staff etc) apply, fixed costs of m = 50, 000 seem to be a good guess for actual fixed costs
for exchange trading. At m = 50, 000, total costs amount to EUR 6 million and average
costs per firm are EUR 7,300 with a quiet large standard deviation of EUR 13,0008.
4.2 Hypothetical Outcome of Non–Competitive Pricing
To compare the application of competitive pricing to the hypothetical case of non–
competitive permit pricing by intermediaries, the model from Section 3.2 is popu-
lated with data from the German part of the EU ETS. In a first step, the monopsonis-
tic/monopolistic price pm (Equation 15) and the alternative ’mimicking price’ pn (Equa-
tion 18) are calculated. Firms choose a trading mode in a second step. Firms choose to
7Free allocation is fixed for each installations from 2011 to 2008 if there are no major changes at the
installation.
8The percentiles of the distribution are 5% (EUR 43); 25% (EUR 394); 50% (EUR 1,486); 75% (EUR 6,211);
95% (EUR 50,000) based on n=819 observations.
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trade with the intermediary if and only if pm < pn or trade directly at the exchange oth-
erwise. To calculate pm based on the German compliance data, sˆi and αi are required
for each firm i in the sample. The variables are generated based on the data by9
sˆi = |verified2008i − qˆi − allocated2011i |. (21)
The change in emissions in the period from 2008 to 2011 is given by10
qˆi = verified
2008
i − verified2011i . (22)





The average shadow price pˆ for the years 2008 to 2011 is assumed to be EUR 15 since
this price level prevailed from 2008 to June 2011. Higher (lower) prices pˆ would lead
to a lower (higher) share of firms that trade with the monopsonistic/monopolistic in-
termediary as shown in Figure 4. The changes in the share of firms that trade at pm
is dependent on m and is approximately independent of the choice of pˆ as the Figure
shows.
After calculating prices pm and pn individually for each of the 771 firms that remained
in the sample11 the share of firms that trade with intermediaries or at the exchange can
be observed and resulting costs can be calculated. Since prices pm and pn are dependent
on the firms characteristics, no single price can be reported. Figure 5 plots prices pm
and pn as resulting from the application and dependent on the annual trading volume
of firms, assuming m = 50, 000 and g = 15. The existence of a single monopsonis-
tic/monopolistic intermediary would result in a situation where 10% of firms trade
with the help of the intermediary while the remaining firms trade directly at the ex-
change at m = 50, 000 and g = 15. As Figure 5 shows, offered permit prices would be
rather high in the hypothetical case of the presence of a single intermediary. Tables 4
and 5 present detailed results on the share of firms that would trade with the monop-
sonistic/monopolistic intermediary for different values of m. Table 4 also presents re-
sults whenm is randomly choosen for each firm based on different standard deviations
form. Table 5 presents a similar sensitivity analysis for the abatement cost coefficient α.
In both cases, the results are stable when a random shock is added tom or α, even if the
share of firms that trade with the intermediary decrease with rising standard deviation.
The results of the model application are summarized in Table 3 for different fixed costs
m. As an outcome of monopolistic/monopsonistic permit trading by a single interme-
9When plugging (22) into (21), the equation collapses to verified2011i − allocated2011i and is equivalent to
the method used in Section 4.1.
10To use as much information as possible when calculating αˆi in Equation (23), the change in emissions
over the years 2008 to 2011 is considered here.
11The sample collapsed from 819 to 771 because full information over the years 2008 to 2011 is needed to
calculate αˆi in Equation (23). Since some firms opted in to the EU ETS after 2008, 48 missing observations are
generated when calculating qˆi. Consequently, those firms are dropped from the sample for the application.
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Figure 4: Share of firms that trade with the monopsonistic/monopolistic intermediary, evaluated for combi-
nations of m and g.
diary, most firms (about 90%) would trade at the exchange at price pn. The markup
of the intermediary (pm − g) ranges in median from 3.73 (at m = 30, 000) to 5.93 (at
m = 100, 000) at g = 15 and is dependent on the fixed costs for exchange trading. This
is an intuitive result since firms have the option to ’escape’ the intermediaries market
power by trading directly at the exchange. Lower costs for exchange trading therefore
drives down the markup in median. Costs for exchange trading in median are given
by pn − g. Independent of assumed fixed costs m, the largest share of permits (99%) is
traded at the exchange. This result is similar to the result of competitive pricing by in-
termediaries, but the share of permits traded at the exchange is about 13% higher in the
non–competitive setup. Total costs range from 21.7 million EUR (atm = 30, 000) to 69.7
million EUR (at m = 100, 000) and are mainly driven by the fixed costs for exchange
trading m. Fixed costs also drive up average costs per firm, which are 28.1 thousand
EUR (at m = 30, 000) and increase to 90.4 thousand EUR (at m = 100, 000).
m % Firms pm − g pn − g % Traded Costs Costs
EUR at exchange median median at exchange (total) mEUR (average) tEUR
30,000 91.44% 3.73 2.87 99.92% 21.7 28.1
40,000 90.40% 4.43 3.73 99.85% 28.7 37.2
50,000 89.75% 4.64 4.58 99.84% 35.6 46.2
60,000 89.36% 4.82 5.44 99.83% 42.5 55.2
70,000 88.59% 5.11 6.28 99.81% 49.4 64.0
80,000 88.07% 5.31 7.15 99.78% 56.2 72.9
90,000 87.42% 5.85 7.76 99.77% 63.0 81.7
100,000 87.16% 5.93 8.38 99.76% 69.7 90.4
Table 3: Percentage of firms that trade at the exchange, average markup pm and quasi markup pn for ex-
change trading. Costs are displayed on the right hand side with total costs in million EUR and
average costs per firm in thousand EUR.
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Figure 5: Price pm (dotts) constrained by price pn and g form = 50, 000 and g = 15. In the application, most
firms trade at the exchange at pn. About 10% of firms trade at pm, which are plotted here.
4.3 Discussion
The model applications presented above examined two different situations for the EU
ETS permit market. Section 4.1 aims to assess fees for permit trading by intermediaries
based on the simple model from Section 2 and based on survey data and official com-
pliance data from the EU ETS in Germany. It revealed that in a competitive setup with
two or more intermediaries in the market, fees for permit trading by intermediaries are
relatively low with about EUR 0.17 per traded permit when fixed costs m for direct
trading at the exchange of EUR 50,000 are assumed (Table 2). This is about 1% of the
permit price when the permit price level is assumed to be EUR 15, as it has been the
case in the years 2008 to June 2011 in the EU ETS.
Section 4.2 examined the hypothetical case of one single intermediary in the permit mar-
ket as described by the model in Section 3.2, where it is assumed that the intermediary
is able to exert market power towards regulated firms in permit trading. The intermedi-
ary’s market power will be limited by the regulated firms ’fallback option’ to trade per-
mits directly at the exchange. As a consequence of monopsonistic/monopolistic pric-
ing by the intermediary, the market structure would change considerably compared to
the case of competitive pricing. Assuming fixed m costs for direct trading at the ex-
change of EUR 50,000, about 90% of firms would trade at the exchange compared to
5% in the competitive setup. 99% of permits would be traded directly at the exchange
by regulated firms compared to 87% in the competitive setup. Figure 5 shows that the
presence of a single intermediary with market power would drive up permit prices
considerably dependent on the firm characteristics, such as the reaction on changes in
the permit price and annual trading volumes. The markup per traded permit is as-
sessed to be 4.64 in median, assuming m = 50, 000 (Table 3).
A comparison of average costs for the case of a non–competitive market and the com-
petitive case shows that average costs for permit trading (fees and fixed costs) in the
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non–competitive setup are about six times higher. Underlying fixed costs m for di-
rect trading at the exchange determine average costs in both cases. Average costs per
regulated firm are EUR 7,300 in the competitive setup compared to EUR 46,200 in the
non–competitive setup, assuming m = 50, 000.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from the model application. Firstly, the fixed
costs m for direct trading at the exchange are an important determinant of the costs
for permit trading in the competitive and the non–competitive case. When designing
an emissions trading scheme, close attention should thus be paid to the potential of
regulated firms to access the market directly at moderate costs. In the EU ETS in Ger-
many, the market is currently structured so that firms with annual trading volumes
of more than 283,000 permits can access the exchange in an economic fashion. Firms
with smaller trading volumes rely on intermediaries for permit trades. Secondly, the
share of unit fees that are taken by intermediaries for permit trades are moderate in
the competitive setup, ranging from 1% to 2% of the permit price when a price of EUR
15 is assumed. Total costs in the EU ETS in Germany are expected to range from EUR
3.6 million (at m = 30, 000) to EUR 12 million (at m = 100, 000). When compared to
general transaction costs in the German EU ETS (excluding trading fees) that are esti-
mated to be EUR 8.7 million per year and that mostly stem from compliance obligations
(i.e. measurement, reporting, and verification of emissions) [13], total fees for permit
trading add considerable costs to the general cost category of accessing the market and
transacting, even in the presence of a competitive permit market.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined the choice of the permit trading mode (intermediary vs. direct ex-
change trading) of a firm regulated by an emissions trading scheme. Given fixed costs
for becoming active at an exchange and unit fees per traded permit charged by interme-
diaries for their services, it was shown that a regulated firm will decide on the trading
mode dependent on the volume of permits it intends to trade. Firms with larger trad-
ing volumes tend to become active directly at the exchange while firms with smaller
volumes trade with the help of intermediaries. This result is supported empirically by
surveys amongst firms regulated in the EU ETS in Germany [2, 19, 18] and a study from
Ireland [15].
An examination of permit pricing strategies of intermediaries showed that a number of
(at least) two non–colluding intermediaries in the permit market is sufficient to gener-
ate a competitive market. This finding is based on the Bertrand Paradox [26] given that
emissions permits can be regarded as a homogeneous good where intermediaries face
no capacity constraints in producing the service of permit trading.
This paper is, to my best knowledge, the first to examine the case of a monopolis-
tic/monopsonistic intermediary that can exert market power in permit trading towards
regulated firms. Market power of an intermediary requires that there is strictly one in-
termediary in the market, which is a highly unlikely case. If there is strictly one inter-
mediary in the market, it will offer a permit price (and charge a fee or markup) that is
dependent on the permit price on the exchange, a firm’s reaction coefficient (i.e. abate-
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ment costs), unrestricted emissions, and free allocation. The regulated firm has the
’fallback option’ to trade permits directly at the exchange given fixed costs. As a best–
response, an intermediary with market power would discriminate prices dependent on
the regulated firm’s permit demand.
The unit fee or markup charged by an intermediary will, in the competitive setup as
well as in the non–competitive setup, lead to a deviation from the first-best abatement
volume as in Montgomery [23]. Free allocation will have an impact on actual costs
for permit trading, which removes the ’independence property’ of allocation [11]. The
costs for permit purchases or sales, whether they occur as fixed costs for accessing an
exchange, as unit fees or a markup from monopolistic/monopolistic behavior of an
intermediary, can be seen as cost for transacting, which are proven to be welfare de-
creasing in schemes of tradeable permits [25, 12].
Based on survey data from firms regulated by the EU ETS in Germany and German
compliance data, a model application examined the case of competitive and non–com-
petitive behaving intermediaries for the EU ETS in Germany. The application implies
that costs for transacting (i.e. unit fees) are relatively low in a competitive setup, rang-
ing from EUR 0.10 to 0.35 per traded permit dependent on assumed fixed costs for
accessing an exchange directly. Fees are below 2% of the permit price when assuming
the permit price to be EUR 15, the approximate average price in the EU ETS for the
years 2008 to 2011. For the German EU ETS this would imply that most firms (about
95%) trade with the help of intermediaries. Firms with annual trading volumes of more
than 283,000 permits become active directly at the exchange. Since the EU ETS is dom-
inated by few large emitters and a larger number of smaller emitters, about 86% of the
traded volume of permits is traded directly at the exchange even if only about 5% of
regulated firms are active at the exchange.
For the hypothetical case of non–competitive pricing by a single intermediary, the
model application implies that most firms would trade directly at the exchange because
of a considerable unit fee (markup) charged by the intermediary with market power.
However, if the intermediary with market power is able to successfully mimic the reg-
ulated firms costs for becoming active at the exchange, it might be able to achieve a
large market share. The total costs for permit trading in the non–competitive case are
six time higher in the model application compared to the competitive case.
Overall, it can be concluded that the risk of monopsonistic/monopolistic trading be-
havior of an intermediary is very low. If there are (at least) two non-colluding inter-
mediaries, a competitive market will evolve. In the unlikely case that there is strictly
one intermediary in the market and that it could possibly exert market power, market
power can be successfully prevented by offering a low–cost option for regulated firms
to purchase or sell permits directly at an exchange. Low–cost options for direct market
access will decrease the costs of transacting in the competitive and non–competitive
case. Low-cost options for direct market access could be generated by appropriate
auctioning platforms, possibly being organized or monitored by a public agency if nec-
essary.
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Fixed costs m Standard deviation σ Lower CI (0.05) Mean Upper CI (0.95)
30000 0 .08560311 .08560311 .08560311
40000 0 .09597925 .09597925 .09597925
50000 0 .10246433 .10246433 .10246433
60000 0 .10635538 .10635538 .10635538
70000 0 .11413749 .11413749 .11413749
80000 0 .11932555 .11932555 .11932555
90000 0 .12581064 .12581064 .12581064
100000 0 .12840466 .12840466 .12840466
30000 1000 .0843061 .08565932 .08690013
40000 1000 .09468223 .09568958 .09597925
50000 1000 .10246433 .10246433 .10246433
60000 1000 .10505836 .10683528 .10894942
70000 1000 .11284047 .11388241 .11413749
80000 1000 .11802854 .11919585 .11932555
90000 1000 .12581064 .12583226 .12581064
100000 1000 .12840466 .12840466 .12840466
30000 2000 .08365759 .08580199 .08819715
40000 2000 .09338521 .09534804 .09597925
50000 2000 .10116731 .10241245 .10246433
60000 2000 .10505836 .1073022 .10894942
70000 2000 .11284047 .1134933 .11413749
80000 2000 .11802854 .11905318 .12062257
90000 2000 .12451362 .12586685 .12710765
100000 2000 .12840466 .12840466 .12840466
30000 3000 .08300908 .08577605 .08819715
40000 3000 .09338521 .09518807 .09727626
50000 3000 .10116731 .10226978 .10376135
60000 3000 .10505836 .10735408 .11024643
70000 3000 .11154345 .11342412 .11413749
80000 3000 .11673152 .11880674 .12062257
90000 3000 .12451362 .12574147 .12710765
100000 3000 .12840466 .12837872 .12840466
30000 4000 .08300908 .0860614 .08819715
40000 4000 .0920882 .09516213 .09727626
50000 4000 .0998703 .10209685 .10376135
60000 4000 .10505836 .10748379 .11024643
70000 4000 .11154345 .11339819 .1154345
80000 4000 .11673152 .11881971 .12062257
90000 4000 .1232166 .12559015 .12710765
100000 4000 .12710765 .12832685 .12840466
30000 5000 .08300908 .08596195 .08949416
40000 5000 .0920882 .09501081 .09727626
50000 5000 .0998703 .10194553 .10376135
60000 5000 .10505836 .10757457 .11024643
70000 5000 .11154345 .11351924 .1154345
80000 5000 .11673152 .11892348 .12062257
90000 5000 .1232166 .12544315 .12710765
100000 5000 .12710765 .12818849 .12840466
Table 4: mi randomly drawn. Percentage of firms that trade with intermediaries (mean and confidence inter-
vals) for fixed costs m and for installation specific fixed costs generated by drawing costs mi from a
normal distribution N(m,σ) for 300 runs. Price g = 15 assumed.
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Fixed costs m Standard deviation σ Lower CI (0.05) Mean Upper CI (0.95)
30000 0 .08560311 .08560311 .08560311
40000 0 .09597925 .09597925 .09597925
50000 0 .10246433 .10246433 .10246433
60000 0 .10635538 .10635538 .10635538
70000 0 .11413749 .11413749 .11413749
80000 0 .11932555 .11932555 .11932555
90000 0 .12581064 .12581064 .12581064
100000 0 .12840466 .12840466 .12840466
30000 .01 .06355383 .07381323 .08690013
40000 .01 .07003891 .08195417 .09468223
50000 .01 .07522698 .08750108 .10116731
60000 .01 .08041505 .09380026 .10635538
70000 .01 .08949416 .10045828 .11413749
80000 .01 .09403373 .10610895 .11932555
90000 .01 .09727626 .11078686 .12386511
100000 .01 .10116731 .11564635 .12840466
30000 .02 .05966277 .07073065 .08171206
40000 .02 .06614786 .07816256 .09079118
50000 .02 .07068741 .08415478 .09792477
60000 .02 .076524 .08956766 .10376135
70000 .02 .08300908 .09634674 .10894942
80000 .02 .08690013 .10131864 .1154345
90000 .02 .09143969 .10495461 .11932555
100000 .02 .09468223 .10940337 .1232166
30000 .05 .04928664 .06285343 .076524
40000 .05 .05836576 .07120623 .0843061
50000 .05 .06420233 .07716385 .08949416
60000 .05 .07133593 .08287073 .09597925
70000 .05 .07392996 .08845655 .10376135
80000 .05 .07911803 .09324254 .10894942
90000 .05 .08236057 .09696066 .11219195
100000 .05 .08690013 .10162127 .11673152
30000 .1 .04280156 .05415478 .06614786
40000 .1 .05123217 .06204928 .07522698
50000 .1 .05577172 .06765673 .08171206
60000 .1 .06225681 .07527021 .08819715
70000 .1 .06679636 .07986598 .0920882
80000 .1 .07133593 .08501513 .09922179
90000 .1 .07522698 .08796369 .10051881
100000 .1 .07846952 .09234328 .10700389
30000 .2 .03372244 .04293558 .05317769
40000 .2 .04150454 .0505923 .06225681
50000 .2 .04669261 .05687851 .0687419
60000 .2 .04798963 .06158236 .07392996
70000 .2 .05317769 .06629486 .07911803
80000 .2 .05836576 .07058798 .08560311
90000 .2 .06095979 .07469952 .08819715
100000 .2 .06355383 .07751405 .08949416
Table 5: αˆi randomly drawn. Percentage of firms that trade with intermediaries (mean and confidence inter-
vals) for fixed costs m and values of ˆalphai randomly drawn from a normal distribution N(0, σ) for
300 runs. Price g = 15 assumed.
